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Summary While analyzing the phone of a Saudi activist infected with NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware, we discovered a zero-day zero-click exploit against iMessage. The exploit, which we call FORCEDENTRY, targets Apple’s image rendering library, and was effective against Apple iOS, MacOS and WatchOS devices. We determined that the mercenary spyware company NSO Group used the vulnerability to remotely ex

Read our description of Zoom’s waiting room vulnerability, as well as frequently asked question about Zoom and encryption issues. This report examines the encryption that protects meetings in the popular Zoom teleconference app. We find that Zoom has “rolled their own” encryption scheme, which has significant weaknesses. In addition, we identify potential areas of concern in Zoom’s infrastructure,

This report was written with the assistance of the research team at Lookout Security. Update (Sept 1, 2016): Today Apple released security updates for Desktop Safari and Mac OS X.  These updates patch the Trident vulnerabilities that identified in this report for desktop users. The Trident vulnerabilities used by NSO could have been weaponized against users of non iOS devices, including OSX. We en

1. Executive Summary This report describes a campaign of targeted spyware attacks carried out by a sophisticated operator, which we call Stealth Falcon.  The attacks have been conducted from 2012 until the present, against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents.  We discovered this campaign when an individual purporting to be from an apparently fictitious organization called “The Right to

阅读报告的主要发现 Key Findings Baidu Browser, a web browser for the Windows and Android platforms, transmits personal user data to Baidu servers without encryption and with easily decryptable encryption, and is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution during software updates via man-in-the-middle attacks. The Android version of Baidu Browser transmits personally identifiable data, including a user’s GPS coo

By Bill Marczak1, 2, 3, Nicholas Weaver2, 3, Jakub Dalek1, Roya Ensafi4, David Fifield3, Sarah McKune1, Arn Rey, John Scott-Railton1, Ron Deibert1, and Vern Paxson2, 3 [1] Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto [2] International Computer Science Institute [3] University of California, Berkeley [4] Princeton University April 10, 2015 This post describes our analysis of Ch

The left newspapers might whine a bit But the guys at the station they don’t give a shit Dispatch calls “Are you doin’ something wicked?” “No siree, Jack, we’re just givin’ tickets” Police Truck, Dead Kennedys (1980) Summary In Part 1, we analyze a newly discovered Android implant that we attribute to Hacking Team and highlight the political subtext of the bait content and attack context. In Part

This post is the second in a series of posts that focus on the global proliferation and use of Hacking Team’s RCS spyware, which is sold exclusively to governments. Read the first report in the series, “Hacking Team and the Targeting of Ethiopian Journalists.” Read the third report in the series, “Hacking Team’s US Nexus.” Summary Remote Control System (RCS) is sophisticated computer spyware marke